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NOTES
PROTECTING AGAINST TERRORISM OR
SYMBOLIC POLITICS?: FATAL FLAWS
IN OHIO'S CRIMINAL TERRORISM
STATUTE'
INTRODUCTION
At approximately four o'clock on the afternoon of Friday, May 9,
2003, an armed gunman wearing a bulletproof vest and a military
helmet entered the Weatherhead School of Management on the cam-
pus of Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio. The
gunman broke into the Weatherhead School's Peter B. Lewis Build-
ing' through a locked rear door.2 Once inside, the gunman shot and
killed the first person he encountered, graduate student Norman Wal-
lace, a first year honors student in the graduate business program
3
who had approached the gunman with his arms raised. 4
At the time the gunman entered, approximately ninety-three 5 pro-
fessors and students were in the building. As gunfire erupted, profes-
sors and students huddled in offices, hid under desks, and barricaded
t Awarded the tenth annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student Note
Award, as selected by the Volume 55 Editorial Board.
There are conflicting reports about how the gunman entered the building. Compare
Tom Breckenridge, Frightened Faculty and Students Hid in Locked Offices, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 10, 2003, at A12 (claiming that the gunman entered the building by kicking
through a back door), with Scott Hiaasen, Death Penalty Sought in CWRU Siege, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 30, 2003, at Al (reporting that the gunman used a "rubber mallet" to enter the
building).
2 Mike Tobin, Search and Survival at CWRU: How SWAT Team Got Gunman, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 14, 2003, at Al.
3 John Horton & Molly Kavanaugh, In the Wake of Tragedy, Graduates Move On:
CWRU Ceremonies Celebrate Victim's Life, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 19, 2003, at Al.
4 Hiaasen, supra note 1.
5 Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Cuyahoga
County, in Cleveland, Ohio (Dec. 23, 2004).
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doors.6 The distinctive architecture of the Peter B. Lewis Building,
with its curving, undulating ceilings and walls and its open foyer,7
made the job of the Cleveland Police SWAT Team and FBI agents
particularly difficult,8 forcing them to play a "cat-and-mouse game" 9
with the shooter.
Biswanath Halder, a sixty-four-year-old Indian immigrant with a
master of business administration from the university, was charged
with the crime. He faced a 338-count indictment, detailing an exhaus-
tive list of charges from kidnapping to aggravated murder.' 0 More-
over, Halder was the first person in Ohio to be charged under the
state's new terrorism statute."
This Note explores whether Biswanath Halder is a "terrorist" and
will, thereby, analyze the purpose and validity of state statutes, in
particular, Ohio's statute, criminalizing terrorism. Part I introduces
the debate over what action constitutes terrorism and provides several
definitional examples and elements inherent in terrorist actions. Part
II provides a general overview of early state and federal legislative
responses to the terrorist threat against the United States since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, concluding that initial state legislative actions do not
rely on the inherent definitional aspects of terrorist action but instead
create overly broad criminal elements encompassing a multitude of
actions potentially unrelated to terrorism. Part III presents an over-
view of Ohio's legislative response to terrorism and analyzes the stat-
ute as applied in the Halder case, ultimately calling into question the
design and purpose of Ohio's terrorism legislation. In continuing this
6 CNN.com, Cleveland Police: University Gunman in Custody, May 10, 2003,
http://www.cnn.con20031US/Midwest/05/09/university.gunfire/.
7 Architect Frank Gehry designed the Peter B. Lewis Building.
8 Tobin, supra note 2, at A2; see also Lila Mills, National Award Honors Cleveland
SWAT Team, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 25, 2003, at B7 (noting that the Cleveland
Police Department's SWAT unit described the building as a "tactical nightmare" because of its
open foyer, several staircases, and rounded walls).
9 Danny Hakim, One Is Dead, One Arrested in Cleveland Campus Siege, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2003, at AI4.
10 Indictment of Biswanath Halder, Ohio v. Biswanath Halder, No. CR-03-437717-ZA
(May 29, 2003) [hereinafter Halder Indictment]. The charges against Halder were eventually
reduced to 196 counts of kidnapping and aggravated murder. On December 16, 2005 Halder
was found guilty of all 196 charges against him, including the aggravated murder of graduate
student Norman Wallace. James F. McCarthy, Case Gunman Guilty; Could Face Death, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 17, 2005, at Al. See also Jim Nichols, Halder's Defense TriesTto
Avoid Death Penalty; His Guilt Is Admitted, Premeditation Is Not, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland),
Dec. 15, 2005, atB1.
" Hiaasen, supra note 1, at A6. After the completion of this Note, Cuyahoga Common
Pleas Judge Peggy Foley Jones dismissed the terrorism charge against Halder. This Note con-
tinues to evaluate the validity of the original terrorism charge against Halder despite the subse-
quent dismissal. Its conclusions remain important in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of
Ohio's terrorism statute and its future application.
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analysis, Part IV reviews the legislative intent behind Ohio's statute
and argues that the statute was misapplied in the Halder case. Part V
contends that state legislative actions inappropriately relied on an
overly broad federal definition of terrorism, the components of which
were not intended to serve as elements for criminal sanction. Part VI
provides a constitutional critique of the Ohio statute, arguing that the
Ohio statute and other state statutes that use similar language are in-
firm as vague. Part VII brings to light procedural difficulties faced by
the Ohio statute and notes its already anomalous application within
the state. Part VIII argues that the Ohio terrorism statute, in particular,
and state statutes in general, do not appropriately address the threat of
terrorism, provide any deterrent effect against genuine terrorism, or
perform their intended purpose. This effectively makes the statutes
symbolic political actions that have been and will continue to be mis-
applied. Finally, Part IX concludes that, though a cohesive federal-
only approach to combating terrorism is more appropriate and effec-
tive, state statutes criminalizing terrorism are likely to flourish. This
Note, therefore, offers recommendations for the rectification of
Ohio's statute and for future state actions criminalizing terrorism.
I. WHAT IS TERRORISM?
Currently, there is no single, universally accepted definition of ter-
rorism. 12 In a 1983 study, Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman identi-
fied 109 different definitions of terrorism with twenty-two different
elements,1 3 and there is every reason to believe that more definitions
have appeared since.1
4
Even the various departments and agencies of the United States
government are unable to agree upon what constitutes terrorism. The
U.S. Department of State, defines terrorism as "premeditated,
politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant
targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended
to influence an audience." 15 The U.S. Department of Defense
classifies terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or
threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are
generally political, religious, or ideological."'' 6 The Code of Federal
12 ROBERTA ARNOLD, THE ICC AS A NEW INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSING TERRORISM 3
(2004).
13 ALEX SCHMID & ALBERT JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM 119-52 (1983).
14 WALTER LAQUEuR, THE AGE OF TERRORISM 143 (1987).
15 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2005).
16 DEP'T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 538 (Joint Publi-
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Regulations defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives."' 17
Experts and scholars are similarly unable to agree on a definition.
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, an internationally recognized expert on terrorism
and insurgency, defines terrorism as "the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the
pursuit of political change."'18 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Specialist in
Terrorism, Congressional Research Service at the Library of
Congress, argues that terrorism is the surprise threat or use of
seemingly random violence against innocents for political ends by a
nonstate actor. 19 According to Black's Law Dictionary, terrorism is
"the use or threat of violence to intimidate or cause panic, esp[ecially]
as a means of affecting political conduct.,
20
Although the above definitions were not intended to serve as the
predicate for the creation of criminal statutes, 2t and, therefore, clearly
reflect "the priorities and particular interests of the specific agency
involved, 2 they each provide a basic understanding of concepts in-
herent in terrorist action. Definitions espoused by both officials and
scholars similarly portray the political nature of terrorist attacks, the
victims and intended targets, the psychological aims of fear and in-
timidation, and the use of violence or force.23
Despite differing perceptions and purposes, understanding what
terrorism does and does not include becomes important given the
cation 1-02, Apr. 12, 2001) (as amended through Aug. 31, 2005), available at http://www.dtic.
mill doctrine/jel/new-pubs/jp I _02.pdf.
17 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(I) (2005).
18 BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 43 (1998).
19 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Introduction: Meeting and Managing the Threat, in ATTACKING
TERRORISM 1,4 (Audrey Kurth Cronin & James M. Ludes eds., 2004).
20 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1484 (7th ed. 1999).
21 Definitions are written relative to purposes. See James A.R. Nafziger, The Grave New
World of Terrorism: A Lawyer's View, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLY 1, 9 (2002) ("[D]efinitions
are tailored to national contexts and a specific threat or range of threats to national security.");
Aaron Noteboom, Terrorism: I Know It When I See It, 81 OR. L. REV. 553, 568 (2002) ("Each
definition has unique ramifications and is only applicable to specific areas of law.").
22 HOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 38.
23 See YONA.H ALEXANDER, COMBATING TERRORISM 3-4 (2005) (detailing agreed upon
fundamental components to terrorism, including an unlawful act, political objectives, and in-
tended outcomes of fear and defining terrorism as "the calculated employment or the threat of
violence by individuals, subnational groups, and state actors to attain political, social, and eco-
nomic objectives in the violation of law"); BOAZ GANOR, THE COUNTER-TERRORISM PUZZLE 17
(2005) ("Terrorism is a form of violent struggle in which violence is deliberately used against
civilians in order to achieve political goals (nationalistic, socioeconomic, ideological, religious,
etc.).").
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increased legislative response to terrorism in the United States after
the attacks of September 11.24 In the months and years following the
9/11 attacks, at least thirty-three states responded by amending their
criminal codes25 to reflect the country's new proactive approach26 to
preventing terrorism on American soil. Likewise, the federal govern-
ment created a definition for "domestic terrorism" through the Unit-
ing and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act, the
"PATRIOT Act," or the "Act"), which amended the United States
Criminal Code.27
Prior to the advent of state statutes, suspected "terrorists" in the
United States were arrested and prosecuted in state criminal courts for
the underlying crime, such as murder, kidnapping, or violent threats.28
Today, suspects may be charged not only with the underlying crime
but may also be directly charged with terrorism or acts that support or
threaten terrorism. 29 A similar approach is used in hate-crime legisla-
tion, which generally creates penalty-enhancement provisions for
24 Christopher L. Blakesley, Ruminations on Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Law and Lit-
erature, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041, 1074 (2003) (concluding that a working definition of terror-
ism is required if prosecutions for terrorism occur).
2 National Conference of State Legislatures, State Legislative Report, Vol. 27, No. 19, 1
(Nov. 2002) (detailing a comprehensive list of states that have amended their criminal codes to
varying degrees to include crimes associated with terrorism, including: Alabama, Alaska, Ari-
zona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
26 Prior to the attacks of September 1I, the United States was largely perceived to have an
"ebb and flow" response to terrorism. See, e.g., ALEXANDER, supra note 23, at 23 (arguing that
historically terrorism against the United States was not viewed as a significant threat and that
terrorist attacks were handled on an "ad hoc basis"); Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism, Strategies
and Grand Strategies, in ATTACKING TERRORISM, supra note 19, at 80 ("With each terrorist
crisis [pre 9/1l], terrorism rose to the top of the presidential agenda. In between crises, it sank to
the bottom .... "); WALTER LAQUEUR, No END To WAR 144 (2003) (comparing government
support for terrorism to the "electrocardiogram of a healthy person-spikes followed by flat
lines").
27 The USA PATRIOT Act was introduced on October 23, 2001 and was signed into law
by President George W. Bush just three days later, on October 26, 2001. Uniting and Strength-
ening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
28 Suspects who committed crimes in a state would be charged with the ordinary offense,
now the underlying crime. See, e.g., Terry Lynn Nichols v. Dist. Ct. of Okla. County, No. PR-
2000-703, 2000 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 13 (charging Terry Lynn Nichols with 163 felony
counts, including 160 counts of first degree murder for his participation in the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma on April 19, 1995); FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBL'N No. 0308, TERRORISM 2000/2001
(2004), http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2OOO_2Ol.htm (noting that Timothy Mc-
Veigh was convicted of eleven counts of murder and conspiracy for his part in the Oklahoma
City bombing).
29 See Halder Indictment, supra note 10.
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defendants convicted of a specified offense when the underlying
crime was committed because of hatred for a protected class. 30 Prior
to the passage of hate-crime legislation, the defendant was convicted
and sentenced only for the so-called underlying offense, be it homi-
cide, assault, or battery.
When terrorism is criminalized statutorily and a defendant is
charged with committing the crime of terrorism, a determination of
what acts rise to the level of terrorism becomes imperative 31 to dis-
cern exactly what action is proscribed. Given current state and federal
legislative responses to terrorism, it will no longer suffice to take Jus-
tice Potter Stewart's approach to defining pornography, that is, "I
know it when I see it."
32
A. Fundamental Elements of Terrorism
1. Motive
Scholars overwhelmingly argue that terrorism is inherently politi-
cal. Hoffman claims that understanding terrorism as politically in-
spired violence is "paramount to understanding its aims, motivations
and purposes., 33 According to this view, terrorists commit violent
acts to beget political change, whether for religious liberation, forcing
regime change, or the mere expression of a perceived political right-
eousness. 34 Terrorism as a politically motivated crime does not in-
clude violence for financial profit 35 or personal vengeance 36 because
terrorism is generally directed in pursuit of a larger political aim
37
rather than individual gain. Stephan Nathanson argues that terrorism
requires a social or political agenda, and a person who engages in
violence that resembles an act of terrorism but whose aims are only
for personal profit is not a terrorist.38 In the absence of such personal
30 Eric Shimamoto, Rethinking Hate Crime in the Age of Terror, 72 UMKC L. REV. 829,
832(2004).
3' LAQUEUR, supra note 26, at 235.
32 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Contra PAUL
PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 16-17 (2001) ("For the great majority of coun-
terterrorist activities ... it is unnecessary to go to great lengths to define it, because one knows
it when one sees it.").
33 HOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 14.
34 Cronin, supra note 19, at 3.
35 RAPHAEL PERL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENSE AND TRADE DIVISION, ISSUE BRIEF FOR
CONGRESS: TERRORISM, THE FUTURE AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 4 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.orglirp/crsflB95112.pdf.
36 PILLAR, supra note 32, at 13-14.
37 HOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 15.
38 Stephen Nathanson, Prerequisites for Morally Credible Condemnations of Terrorism,
in THE POLITICS OF TERROR 3, 11 (William Crotty ed., 2004).
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or political distinctions, Nathanson posits that the lines against which
we identify terrorists will become blurred,39 confusing run-of-the-mill
criminal activity with terrorism.
Beyond political motivations, as that term is typically understood,
terrorism in the twenty-first century has expanded to include relig-
iously motivated violence that combines "ideological and criminal
elements."''4 Today, along with politically motivated violence, reli-
gious and nationalist fanaticism are the predominate features of ter-
rorism,4' and "political" in this regard encompasses "religious moti-
vations or social issues, 42 including changing social or economic
policies. Using as examples the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995 and the sarin nerve gas
attack on a Tokyo subway in 1995, Hoffman notes that the most seri-
ous terrorist attacks of the last decade have been perpetrated either by
religiously motivated groups or terrorists with significant religious
dimensions.43 The attacks of September 11, known to be perpetrated
by the Islamic fundamentalist group Al-Qaeda, support Hoffman's
theory that terrorist attacks by religiously and politically motivated or
based groups are the new adversaries. Audrey Kurth Cronin further
supports Hoffman's thesis, noting that terrorism has become an "un-
precedented threat" in large part due to its "radical religiously in-
spired ideology."44
2. Targets
Many definitions of terrorism include acts that target persons
solely in order to influence a larger audience.45 The immediate victim
of the attack is, therefore, not necessarily the target. Terrorist action
ultimately targets, and, therefore, intends to influence governments or
large civilian bodies among whom terrorists hope to trigger a reac-
tion46 that will bring notoriety to or advance their cause. The immedi-
ate victim of the attack is usually not as important as the broader mes-
sage or effect.47 For example, terrorists may hijack an airplane to
force the release of imprisoned comrades 48 or educate the world as to
39 Id.
40 LAQUEUR, supra note 26, at 13.
41 Id. at 29.
42 PILLAR, supra note 32, at 14.
43 HOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 92.
44 Cronin, supra note 19, at 2.
45 Nathanson, supra note 38, at 7.
46 Cronin, supra note 19, at 3.
47 JOHN RICHARD THACKRATH, DICTIONARY OF TERRORISM 265 (2d ed. 2004).
48 Nathanson, supra note 38, at 7. For example, in 1985 Lebanese Shi'a terrorists hijacked
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
their particular oppression 9 and the inequities of a particular govern-
ment or social system.
A terrorist's ultimate goal is to bring about ends which will coin-
cide with certain political, ideological, or religious aims. To obtain
this end, terrorists use well-planned attacks aimed at only a few to
intimidate or coerce a larger target audience. Even action aimed at a
particular individual, such as the assassination of former Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish religious extremist, Yigal Amir,
in 1995, holds true to this pattern. The assassination of Rabin was
intended to disrupt the entire Israeli-Palestinian peace process.50 Vio-
lence and the attention it creates are used to portray a broader mes-
sage, and the immediate victims are a means to this larger end.
3. Psychological Dimensions
Terrorism is not only about violence but, as Hoffman notes, "is as
much about the threat of violence as the violent act itself and, accord-
ingly, is deliberately conceived to have far-reaching psychological
repercussions beyond the actual target of the act." 51 Terrorist action is
taken against the immediate victim to induce fear and intimidation in
the larger population or to change their behavior. Terrorists rely on
this resulting vulnerability to influence policy-makers to accede to
their demands.
Terrorist actions can have enormous psychological effects on large
social populations, forcing them to alter their daily activities, change
their perceptions of their security and effectively undermine and dele-
gitimize the societal structure of which they are a part.52 These effects
were clear immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11. In
the weeks following the attacks, nearly one-third of the world's com-
mercial airplanes were grounded53 because of a lack of flight demand.
The simultaneous hijacking of four planes within the United States
TWA flight 847 to demand the release of 776 Shi'a held in Israel.
49 Id.
SO HOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 92; see also Ehud Sprinzak, Extremism and Violence in Is-
rael: The Crisis of Messianic Politics, 555 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 114, 123-25
(1998) (noting that Amir concluded that Rabin "had to be killed for the peace process to stop").
51 HOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 38.
52 John Alan Cohan, Formulation of State's Response to Terrorism and State-Sponsored
Terrorism, 14 PACE INT'L L. REV. 77, 80 (2002) ("[Tlerrorists seek a psychological goal: to
embitter humanity, to polarize people and society; to pit one national against another; and one
group of people against another. Terrorists seek to destabilize world order.").
53 Noteboom, supra note 21, at 553.
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had left not only American citizens, but also the entire world, ques-
tioning the safety of air travel.
HI. FIRST RESPONDERS-STATE AND FEDERAL
LEGISLATION AFTER 9/11
After the attacks of September 11, state lawmakers across the
country drafted more than 1,200 bills sanctioning newly anticipated
acts of terrorism, ranging from criminal acts of looting during a ter-
rorist attack to committing acts of terrorism. 54 Undoubtedly, lawmak-
ers designed such legislation to instill confidence in the country's
heightened commitment and proactive approach to defending the
United States and curbing terrorist attacks on its soil. 55 The first state
legislation criminalizing terrorism and the federal statute defining
domestic terrorism in response to the 9/11 attacks, however, did not
entirely rely on the fundamental elements of what constitutes "terror-
ism" as espoused by several government agencies and scholars, par-
ticularly the inherent political, social, or religious motivations of ter-
rorist action.
A. New York-The First State Responder
Less than one week after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
New York led the way in drafting state legislative responses to terror-
ism, enacting Penal Law article 490.56 In detailing the elements of the
crime of terrorism, the New York legislation relied on the pre-
September 11 federal definition of international terrorism in 18
U.S.C. § 233 1.5 Penal Law article 490 defines an act of terrorism as
"an act or acts constituting a specified offense. . . that is intended to:
(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) influence the policy
of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) affect the
conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnap-
54 State Lawmakers Draft More than 1,200 Sept. 11-Related Bills, Apr. 22, 2002,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=3988&printer-friendly=y.
55 See generally Blakesley, supra note 24, at 1045-46 ("In the face of terrorist attack, es-
pecially one as senseless and atrocious as that of September 11, we are tempted to promulgate
rules for 'protection' and 'security'....").
56 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney 2005).
57 Richard A. Greenberg & Steven Y. Yurowitz, Analyzing New York's Anti-Terrorism
Statute, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 2002, at 4. The definition of international terrorism under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331 includes criminal acts that "appear to be intended--(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and (C)
occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2331
(2000).
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ping. ' 58 A "specified offense" under the statute includes class A fel-
ony offenses, such as murder, kidnapping, and arson; a violent felony
offense; manslaughter in the second degree; criminal tampering in the
first degree; identity theft; unlawful possession of personal identifica-
tion information; money laundering in support of terrorism; and "at-
tempt or conspiracy to commit any such offense." 59
As a precursor to the statutory section criminalizing terrorism,
New York provides a Legislative Findings section, justifying the en-
actment of the law based upon the terrorist attacks of September 11,
the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, and
other terrorist actions both abroad and in the United States. 60 The
Legislative Findings section concludes:
A comprehensive state law is urgently needed to complement
federal laws in the fight against terrorism and to better protect
all citizens against terrorist acts. Accordingly, the legislature
finds that our laws must be strengthened to ensure that terror-
ists ... are prosecuted and punished in state courts with ap-
propriate severity.6 '
The law thereby proclaims to enhance public safety through the crea-
tion of new criminal offenses and increased penalties.62
In its Legislative Findings section, the New York statute claims
that preexisting state laws are not sufficient to address the threat of
terrorism, citing in relation to its own state the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center, the 1997 shooting atop the Empire State Build-
ing, and the 1994 murder of Ari Halberstam, a Jewish student, on the
Brooklyn Bridge.63 Despite this proclamation, the Findings provide
58 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2005). A person is guilty of the
"Crime of Terrorism," under § 490.25, when "with intent to-(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii)
affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping he or she
commits a specified offense." Edgar Morales, a member of the St. James Boys street gang, has
been indicted under the New York terrorism statute in connection with the gang-shooting death
of a ten-year-old girl and is the first gang member to be indicted under the state's terrorism
statute. Id. § 490.25 The charge has sparked disagreement among lawmakers who voted for the
legislation, from staunch support ("gangs serve as a forum to promote terrorism") to sharp
criticism. See Maria Castro, New York Gang Member Faces Trial as Terrorist,
www.infowars.com/articles/ps/gamg-member-charged-asterrorist.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2006); see also Michelle Garcia, New York Using Terrorism Law To Prosecute Street Gang;
Critics Say Post 9-11 Legislation Is Being Applied Too Broadly, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at
A3.
59 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05(3)(a).
- Id. § 490.00.
61 Id.
62 Id. § 490.05 note (Legislative Intent).
63 Id.
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no examples of legislative shortfalls supporting this argument. Each
of the above-listed crimes was investigated, prosecuted, and punished
on the criminal level.
B. USA PATRIOTAct-The Federal Government
The USA PATRIOT Act was similarly passed in direct response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11 and serves as a cornerstone of
the federal government's effort to prevent terrorist attacks in the
United States, providing for the development of a wide array of inves-
tigative tools. Section 802 of the PATRIOT Act defines "domestic
terrorism" as activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation
or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruc-
tion, assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.64
The PATRIOT Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 2331 to include the
above definition of "domestic terrorism., 65 This definition was drawn
directly from the preexisting definition of "international terrorism"
defined in § 2331 as criminal acts that
appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by in-
timidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a gov-
ernment by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping,
and (C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States .... 66
The Act does not create a new crime of "domestic terrorism" but has
"greatly expanded that class of suspects" 67 considered terrorists that
64 Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802(a), 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001).
65 Id.
- 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2005).
67 John W. Whitehead, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland Security": A
Constitutional Analysis of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Justice Department's Anti-Terrorism
Initiatives, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 1081, 1092-94 (2002) (noting that the USA PATRIOT Act "has
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may be further scrutinized under the sweeping investigative authority
of the PATRIOT Act. Critics of the Act, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), criticize the definition of domestic terrorism
as overly broad, potentially encompassing nonterrorist activities and
organizations.68 Nadine Strossen, President of the ACLU, proclaims
that the "definition of terrorism under the new law is so severely
broad that it applies far beyond what most people think of as terror-
ism."69 The definition, the ACLU argues, "is broad enough to encom-
pass the activities of several prominent activist campaigns and or-
ganizations" 70 such as Greenpeace, Operation Rescue, and World
Trade Organization protestors.
The argument charging the PATRIOT Act as overly broad is based
in part on the fact that a defendant need not have the actual intent to
commit a crime to bring him within the scope of the Act.71 Rather, a
defendant who engages in an act in violation of the criminal laws that
is "dangerous to human life" need only commit an act that "appear[s]
to be intended" to, for example, "intimidate or coerce a civilian popu-
lation. 72 The lack of actual intent, that an act need only appear to be
intended, implies a "subjective standard by which terrorism will be
measured. 73 A person's actual intent to commit an underlying crimi-
nal act dangerous to human life is not relevant, rather only how the
action is perceived is of importance. For example, Environmental
Protection Agency protestors opposing the drilling of oil in Alaska's
national wildlife refuge, who exchange blows with antagonized em-
ployees, may be deemed terrorists.74 Professor Susan Tiefenbrun
notes that, absent a described intent, actions not intended as terrorism
could be investigated as terrorism. She argues that "[t]he element of
intent should be a necessary requirement in the definition of terror-
greatly expanded the class of suspects" whose activities may be considered terrorism).
68 ACLU, How the USA PATRIOT Act Redefines "Domestic Terrorism," Dec. 6, 2002,
http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=1 1437&c= 11 [hereinafter Re-
defines Domestic Terrorism].
69 Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Police State, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec 3, 2001, http://www.
insightmag.comlmedia/paper44llnews/200at12/03/National/Police.State-l 4 32 3 6 .shtm (last vis-
ited Sept. 20, 2005).
70 Redefines Domestic Terrorism, supra note 68.
71 See Lindsay Kendrick, Alienable Rights and Unalienable Wrongs: Fighting the "War
on Terror" Through the Fourth Amendment, 47 HOW. L.J. 989, 1000 (2004) (noting that the
definition of terrorism in the USA PATRIOT Act could encompass a wide range of activities).
72 Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001).
73 Kendrick, supra note 71, at 1000.
74 Cf. Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of Terrorism, 9 ILSA
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 357, 372-73 (2003) (utilizing a similar example to portray the difficulties
with Great Britain's terrorism legislation because it does not include the element of intent).
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ism ''75 so as not to include justifiable acts of self-defense and to ap-
propriately condemn true acts of terrorism, concluding that one of the
basic structural elements of a definition of terrorism must include "the
intent to cause violence" or the "wanton disregard for its conse-
quences ... [or] for the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimi-
dating an enemy. '76 If a definition of terrorism does not include an
element of intent then it will encompass an array of additional ordi-
nary activities.
In addition, particular statutory sections of both the New York ter-
rorism statute and the PATRIOT Act do not account for the outlined
fundamental aspects of motive, target, and psychological dimensions
inherent to terrorist action. Specifically, that portion of each statute
that criminalizes acts that "intimidate or coerce a civilian population"
does not express the political, religious, or social motives innate to
terrorism, 77 but instead permits any motivation including personal
vengeance and pecuniary gain. The PATRIOT Act similarly ignores
the fundamental aspects of terrorist action motivated by political,
religious, or social goals through its lack of an express intent re-
quirement. Accordingly, there becomes a severe disconnect between
the espoused legislative notions of acts rising to the level of terrorism
and the common understanding of terrorism. 78
III. APPLICATION OF OHIO'S TERRORISM STATUTE
TO THE HALDER CASE
A. The Terrorism Statute
Less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, state Republican
Senator Robert Spada introduced Senate Bill 184 in the Ohio State
Legislature. Governor Robert Taft signed the bill seven months later
and touted the legislation as "an important tool for our law enforce-
ment to prosecute individuals who commit acts of terror., 79 The law,
75 Id. at 390.
76 Id. at 362.
77 The other elements of both the New York terrorism statute and the USA PATRIOT Act
do not encounter this same disconnect as the actions they detail are expressly tailored to political
actions. See Patriot Act § 802 (stating that an action must appear to be intended to "affect the
conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping"); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 490.05(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 2005) (requiring that an individual commit a specified offense
with the intent to "influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or coercion").
78 Popular culture tends to think of terrorism as actions similar to actions like those perpe-
trated against the United States on September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center bombing in
1993, or the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.
79 Press Release, Governor Bob Taft, Taft Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill (May 15, 2002),
http://govemor.ohio.gov/releases/051502sb 184.htm.
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Taft claimed, provides a "clear definition for acts of terrorism"' and
raises the penalties for persons convicted of terrorist-related crimes.8'
The Ohio Terrorism Statute, section 2909.24 of the Ohio Revised
Code, states, "(A) No person shall commit a specified offense with
purpose to do any of the following: (1) Intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (2) Influence the policy of any government by intimida-
tion or coercion; (3) Affect the conduct of any government by the
specified offense., 82
A "specified offense" under the statute means a felony offense of
violence; disrupting public services; contaminating a substance for
human consumption, the release of a hazardous substance or the
spreading of a false report of contamination or release; or an attempt
to commit, complicity in committing, or a conspiracy to commit one
of the above-listed offenses. 83 The cross-reference to a "felony
offense of violence" imports a detailed list of aggravated felonies
including murder, manslaughter, assault, abduction, sexual battery,
arson, robbery, inducing panic, domestic violence, and a variety of
other crimes.84 The statute makes a terrorist offense one degree
higher85 than the most serious underlying offense. If the underlying
offense is the felony of first degree murder, the sentence is lengthened
to life imprisonment without parole, and if the underlying specified
offense is aggravated murder, the offender is to be sentenced to life
without parole or the death penalty.86 The statute further considers
terrorism an aggravating circumstance when determining a death
sentence.
87
8 Id.
81 Id.
82 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24 (LexisNexis 2003).
83 Id. § 2909.21(E).
84 Legislative Service Commission, Substitute Senate Bill 184 (providing a comprehen-
sive list of qualified specified offenses, including: aggravated murder; murder; voluntary man-
slaughter; involuntary manslaughter; felonious assault; aggravated assault; assault; permitting
child abuse; aggravated menacing; menacing by stalking; menacing; kidnapping; abduction;
extortion; rape; sexual battery; gross sexual imposition; aggravated arson; arson; aggravated
robbery; robbery; aggravated burglary; inciting to violence; aggravated riot; riot; inducing
panic; domestic violence; endangering children in certain circumstances; intimidation; intimida-
tion of an attorney, victim or witness in a criminal case; escape; improperly discharging a fire-
arm at or into a habitation or in a school safety zone; burglary in certain instances; or the former
offense of felonious sexual penetration).
85 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24. The Ohio system for felony sentencing creates defi-
nite prison sentences for five degrees of felonies: between three and ten years for first degree
felonies; between two and eight years for second degree felonies; between one and five years for
third degree felonies; between six and eighteen months for fourth degree felonies; and between
six months and one year for fifth degree felonies. Id. § 2929.14(A); see also Burt W. Griffin &
Lewis R. Katz, Sentencing Consistency: Basic Principles Instead of Numerical Grids: The Ohio
Plan, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1,4-5 (2002).
86 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24.
87 National Conference of State Legislatures, Summaries of Crime-Related Terrorism
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The Ohio terrorism statute is expressly based on the terrorism leg-
islation passed in New York.88 Both the Ohio and New York statutes
are more narrowly defined than the federal definition of domestic
terrorism. The Ohio legislature tightened the culpable state of mind
standard required for a terrorism conviction from acts that merely
"appear to be intended" under the PATRIOT Act definition to acts
committed with "purpose." 89 Under the Ohio statute, similar to New
York, a prosecutor will be required to affirmatively prove a defen-
dant's purpose.
B. The Halder Case
To convict Biswanath Halder for the crime of terrorism under
Ohio law, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor was required to show that
Halder committed a "specified offense" with the "purpose" to "in-
timidate" or "coerce" a "civilian population."
In this case, the prosecutor was not relying on those sections of
the terrorism statute that deal with a specified offense committed ei-
ther with purpose to influence the policy of any government by in-
timidation or coercion or that affect the conduct of any government
by the specified offense. 90 Accordingly, these sections of the Ohio
statute are not applicable to the Halder case as argued by the prosecu-
tor and will not be discussed further.91
The indictment against Halder includes the "specified offense"
charges of aggravated murder and kidnapping (one charge for every
State Enactments, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cj/02terrorsum.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2005).
88 Press Release, Governor Bob Taft, Taft Urges Swift Passage of Anti-Terrorism Bills
(Oct. 30, 2001), http://www.governor.ohio.gov/releases/Archive20Ol/lO3O2OOl9021.htm [here-
inafter Swift Passage]. Though the Ohio legislation is expressly based on its counterpart in New
York, the Ohio statute makes one interesting change to the New York statute. Part (iii) of an act
of terrorism in New York criminalizes specified offenses intended to "affect the conduct of a
unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05
(McKinney Supp. 2005). Ohio's comparable section is significantly broader, criminalizing
specified offenses committed with the purpose to "affect the conduct of any government by the
specified offense." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24 (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added). Ohio
thereby criminalizes a significantly larger degree of conduct than the New York statute. This
issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
89 Compare Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 802, 115 Stat. 272, 376 (2001), with OHIO
REV. CODE ANN § 2909.24 (LexisNexis 2003).
90 Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, supra note 5.
91 As noted earlier, these statutory sections do not pose the same problems as that portion
of the Ohio statute that requires a purpose "to intimidate or coerce a civilian population" as they
are appropriately related to conduct inherent in terrorist action, namely political, religious, or
social motivations. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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person in the building that day). 92 Although the prosecutor had to
prove that Halder entered the building with the purpose of committing
aggravated murder93 and kidnapping, 94 he also had to show beyond a
reasonable doubt that Halder entered the building with the specific
intention95 to commit aggravated murder and kidnapping to "intimi-
date or coerce a civilian population."
1. Purpose
The Ohio terrorism statute requires the commission of a specified
offense with the mens rea of "purpose, 96 to intimidate or coerce. Sec-
tion 2901.22 of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to
cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a
prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of
what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is his spe-
cific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.9
Purpose requires an express intent either to cause a particular re-
sult or to engage in conduct of a certain nature regardless of what the
offender intends to accomplish through that conduct. The Ohio code
equates conduct committed purposely to conduct committed "inten-
tionally, willfully, or deliberately. 98
If the prosecutor is able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed a specified offense with the above-detailed
requisite purpose to intimidate the population, he may be convicted of
terrorism whether or not the civilian population was in fact
intimidated or coerced. The only element of significance is a
defendant's express purpose in committing the specified offense, not
92 Halder Indictment, supra note 10. Halder is also charged with attempted murder (one
count for each bullet Halder allegedly fired at the scene), aggravated burglary, and unlawful
possession of a dangerous ordnance.
93 To show aggravated murder, the prosecution must prove that Halder "purposely, and
with prior calculation and design, cause[d] the death of another." OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2903.01 (LexisNexis 2003).
94 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2905.01 (outlining the elements of the offense of kidnap-
ping).
95 Ohio defines purpose as "specific intention." Id. § 2901.22.
96 Id. § 2909.24.
97 Id. § 2901.22.
98 Id. cmt. (Committee Comment to H 511 (1974)). As cross-referenced to the terrorism
statute in section 2909.24, an "Act of Terrorism" is defined in section 2909.21 as "an act that is
committed within or outside the territorial jurisdiction of this state or the United States, that
constitutes a specified offense . . . and that is intended to do one or more of the following"
(emphasis added). Therefore, according to the Ohio Revised Code, "purpose" and "intent" are
synonymous. Id.
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any resulting intimidation or coercion. The prosecutor may not simply
point out to the jury that the civilian population was intimidated by
parading frightened witnesses across the stand. The prosecutor must
prove that the defendant acted with the explicit purpose of causing
this intimidation.
2. Intimidate
Section 2909.24 does not define the term "intimidate." In the pro-
visional Ohio Jury Instructions" relating to terrorism, intimidate
means "to frighten, scare or bully." 1°°
There is no doubt that Halder's actions frightened, scared, and bul-
lied those inside the building. Faculty and students used telephones
and e-mail throughout the seven-hour siege to contact family and
friends, relaying their thoughts and fears.Il l As Halder roamed the
hallways, shots reverberated through the open building, creating a
"complete sense of fear." 10 2 Some called the events "mind-numbing"
as they agonized over the fate of friends and family trapped inside;' °3
it was "a nightmare for all involved."'1 4 Whether this was Halder's
purpose though, remains an open question.
3. Coerce
Similarly, the Ohio terrorism statute provides no definition of "co-
erce." Related provisional Ohio Jury Instructions provide that coerce
means "to compel or force."10 5 Coercion implies a broader goal than
mere intimidation, as coercion attempts to bring about a subsequent
change or goal. The proscribed coercion serves as an alternative to
99 OHIO JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS CMTE., OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS
vii (2005) [hereinafter OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS] ("When publishing jury instructions under
new legislation that has not been authoritatively interpreted by the Ohio appellate courts, the
Committee has designated the instructions as PROVISIONAL. The users of OJI are thereby
warned that these instructions are a Committee product that is published to be of assistance to
the bench and bar of Ohio, but (of necessity) without specific judicial approval."); see also id. at
x ("The committee has no authority that implies approval of the instructions or requires their
use."). Although the OJI instructions on terrorism are not designated as "provisional" they
should be read as provisional as the courts have not yet tested the statute.
1I1d. at 378.
101 Breckenridge, supra note 1.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Editorial, Horror and Heroism: As Bad as It Was, Gunman's Assault on Lewis Building
Could Have Been Far Worse Without Swift Police Response, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May
13, 2003, at B8.
105 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 99, at 378.
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intimidation in the statute, as an offense must be committed with the
purpose to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.
Whether Halder possessed the express intent to compel or force a
civilian population is also open to discussion. Again, whether Hal-
der's alleged actions actually coerced a population is not relevant,
only whether he had that purpose. Given the subsequent change or
goal inherent in coercion, the prosecutor must show that Halder's
specific intention was to compel or force a civilian population to ac-
tion or reaction.
4. Civilian Population
Section 2909.24 does not define "civilian population," and it is not
otherwise defined in the Ohio Revised Code or the applicable Jury
Instructions. In the absence of a statutory definition, the Ohio
Supreme Court has held that a term "is to be accorded its common,
everyday meaning.' 1°6 According to Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary, a population can range from "the whole number of people
or inhabitants in a country or region" to "the total of individuals
occupying an area," or even "a body of persons or individuals having
a quality or characteristic in common."' 0 7 The common, everyday
meaning of population may be construed differently given the context
of the situation. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and
America's subsequent reaction provides a clear illustration of the
various understandings of population. The attack by Japanese air
forces in Hawaii was felt across the entire population of the United
States, for, at that time, an attack of such magnitude had never
occurred on America's soil. The assault struck at the core psyche of
our country's safety, and the entire country felt its effects. The
residents of Hawaii, however, more immediately felt the effects of the
attack, as the population of that particular state. 108 More narrowly, the
strike was limited to the naval base at Pearl Harbor and the population
of the U.S. military. The U.S. response further singled out a particular
population based on a common characteristic, namely those of
Japanese ancestry. Depending upon one's perceptions of the event,
how broadly or narrowly it is viewed, the population affected will
change. Therefore, absent clear standards regarding the population to
be considered, the civilian population affected under the Ohio
'0 State v. Dorso, 446 N.E.2d 449, 451 (1983).
107 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 966 (11 th ed. 2003).
108 At the time of the attack at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii was only a territory of the United
States and did not receive statehood until August 21, 1959. See Hawaii State Government, A
Brief History of Hawaii, http://www.hawaii.gov/about/history.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
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terrorism statute may constitute only two people, an entire town, the
county, the state, or maybe even the entire country. 0 9
"Civilian" as it is generally understood means a person "not on
active duty in the armed services or not on a police or firefighting
force."" 0 Given the formulation of Ohio's terrorism statute, a
different understanding of civilian is advanced. The second and third
elements of the crime of terrorism in Ohio include purposeful conduct
aimed to "influence the policy of any government by intimidation or
coercion" and "affect the conduct of any government by the specified
offense." As these sections deal specifically with the government, the
statute implies that the catch-all "civilian population" outlined in the
first section includes the population of the United States, not
including the government. The understanding of civilian is thereby
subtly changed from its everyday understanding of persons "not in the
armed services or the police force" to persons not in the government.
A civilian population of persons not in the government excludes a
broader range of persons than those simply not in the armed services
or police force."'
According to Cuyahoga County Assistant Prosecutor Rick Bell,
the ninety-three people trapped inside the Peter B. Lewis Building
during Halder's alleged rampage constituted a civilian population." 2
Given that population is not defined in the statute, Bell urges that
anything more than two people may constitute the necessary civilian
population. 3 Bell has further argued that the intense media scru-
tiny' 1 4 centered on Cleveland during the attack strengthens the notion
of intimidation that spread throughout a civilian population." 5 And,
family and friends of those trapped inside the building may also have
been intimidated by Halder's actions, fearful and frightened for the
109 This argument was also put forth in the Washington-area sniper case against John Allen
Muhammad. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss The Indictment Herein Due to
Constitutional Failure of the Prosecution for Capital Murder Pursuant to Virginia Code §§ 18.2-
18.31(13), and 46.4 ET SEQ. at 11, Virginia v. Muhammad, No. 102500 (dismissed Oct. 5,
2004). The constitutionality of Virginia's terrorism statute is currently under review in the
state's supreme court.
I °MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 107, at 226.
11 Eric Shimamoto, Rethinking Hate Crime in the Age of Terror, 72 UMKC L. REV. 829,
837 (2004) (noting that the USA PATRIOT Act's definition of domestic terrorism subtly alters
the meaning of the phrase "a civilian population" as used in the definition of international terror-
ism).
112 Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, supra note 5.
113 Id. (according to Bell a "population of two is on the low end" of what would constitute
a civilian population).
n
4 Scholars argue that terrorists use violence that will generate media attention through
which they can communicate their message to a larger audience. See HOFFMAN, supra note 18,
at 132 (noting that the "modem news media, as the principal conduit of information about such
acts, thus play a vital part in the terrorists' calculus").
115 Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, supra note 5.
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lives of their loved ones as they watched events unfold on the national
and local news. However, it is important to remember that though
Halder may have affected a civilian population, under the Ohio stat-
ute, the prosecutor would need prove that Halder's specific purpose
was to intimidate or coerce a civilian population.
5. Analysis
Assistant Prosecutor Bell has argued that Halder's actions fell
squarely within the bounds of Ohio's terrorism statute. 16 He has con-
tended that not only did Halder have the requisite purpose to commit
aggravated murder, but that it was also his specific intention to "in-
timidate or coerce a civilian population."
'
"
17
Halder not only has an educational history with the Case Weather-
head School of Management but also a legal history. Although he
completed his master of business administration in 1999, Halder con-
tinued to take classes at the university sporadically in order to main-
tain computer lab privileges. 18 He spent the majority of his time
working on a personal web site aimed at helping Indian immigrants in
the business field." 9 On July 13, 2000, Halder charged that a hacker
entered his personal web site and deleted files.' 20 One month earlier,
Halder alleged that someone entered the web site, posting an anony-
mous, mocking e-mail stating "Bizzy [short for Biswanath] Halder is
a moron."' 21 Halder blamed university computer lab employee,
Shawn Miller,' 22 for sabotaging his web site123 and filed a lawsuit
against Miller seeking $25,000 in damages for intentional infliction of
116Id.
17 OHIO REV. CODE § 2909.24 (LexisNexis 2003).
18 Scott Hiaasen & John Mangels, Loner's Rage Burned After Ruin of Web Site, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 11, 2002, at Al.
"9 James F. McCarty, All Signs Therefor an Attack: Psychologist, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), May 12, 2003 at A2.
120id.
12 1 Id.
122 Though not injured in the attack, Shawn Miller was in the building at the time of the at-
tack. See Mike Tobin & Scott Hiaasen, CWRU Suspect a Reclusive, Quirky Figure, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), May 18, 2003, at Al.
123 Hiaasen, supra note 1.
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emotional distress. 24 Miller was found not liable on all charges125 and
continues to deny any involvement in defacing Halder's web site. 1
26
Subsequently, Halder took his complaints regarding Miller to the
university administration, the city of Cleveland police department, the
mayor of Cleveland, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and even to
Congress, inundating each with letters seeking legal action.127 Hal-
der's appeal of his civil suit against Miller was denied just two weeks
before the shooting.
Given this complicated history, Bell has argued that Halder's mo-
tive was not simply revenge upon Miller, but to make a statement
against the university administration and the city of Cleveland for
their lack of action in resolving his legal claims. 28 Thus, Bell has
reasoned that Halder's motive was not merely vengeful because of
several inflammatory comments Halder made in letters to city offi-
cials. In 2001, Halder wrote to then-Mayor Michael White: "if the
unholy trio of an incompetent police department, a perfect idiot
mayor, and a felon clerk of the council continue to rule Cleveland,
very dark days are ahead for Clevelanders.' 29 When his pleas went
unnoticed, Halder wrote to Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge
John Sutula (who sat in the civil suit Halder filed against Miller), stat-
ing that "[t]he end result of all of these outright evil actions will be
that society will end up paying a severe price."'
130
Based on statements like those above and Halder's use of the rele-
vant chain of command in trying to resolve his claims (working
through the university administration, local police, city officials, the
courts, and finally, federal officials), 13' Bell has argued that Halder's
purpose was to force the university to more appropriately address his
legal claims, 32 that is, intimidate and coerce the university and its
administration to action. Thus, Bell has reasoned that Halder pos-
sessed both the purpose to intimidate and coerce a civilian population
124 Docket, Halder v. Miller, No. CV-01-441308 (May 2003) [hereinafter Halder Docket],
available at http://cpdocket.cuyahoga.oh.us/cjisjs/servletlcjis.urd/run/cmsw l01.
125 During the trial, Miller obtained an injunction against Halder, requiring that Halder re-
move all references to Miller on his web site, including but not limited to copies of any letters or
statements accusing Miller of illegally accessing Halder's web site or Unix Shell Account.
Furthermore, Halder was enjoined from publication of any written or oral communications
accusing Miller of tampering with, or otherwise accessing his web site. See Halder Docket,
supra note 124.
126 Tobin & Hiaasen, supra note 122.
1
27 McCarty, supra note 119; see also Hiaasen, supra note 1.
128 Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, supra note 5.
129 Hiaasen & Mangels, supra note 118.
130 Id.
13? Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, supra note 5.
13 2 Id.
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in committing the qualifying specified offenses of aggravated murder
and kidnapping.1
33
Considering Halder's history with Shawn Miller, the question re-
mains as to whether Halder possessed the requisite purpose under the
statute. Halder arguably harbored significant anger against Miller,
whom he blamed for the destruction of his personal web files and the
posting of mocking messages on his web site. According to neighbors
and associates, Halder's personal web site was his life.134 He spent
hours each day working on his web site, writing about his passions,
and posting them for others to read.1 35 Halder was arguably distressed
and angered by Miller's alleged actions and the ability of Miller to
escape justice for the destruction of his life's work, as evidenced by
his continued complaints to police 136 and his attempt to appeal the
trial court decision in his civil suit. Miller was in the building, hiding
in a locked basement office 137 at the time Halder stalked through the
business school. The door behind which Miller was hiding was
sprayed with bullets and, while he was hiding, someone, presumably
Halder, tried to enter. 138 Arguably, this shows that Halder did not seek
to make a larger statement against the university's administration, but
sought Miller, the man he had pursued legally for years, as a target to
revenge the destruction of his life's work. 139 Miller himself even
questioned if the gunman could be Halder, wondering, "what if it was
him?" while he waited to be rescued.
140
If Halder's actions were motivated only by revenge against Miller,
his actions would not rise to the level of terrorism under the Ohio
statute because Halder would lack the required purpose to intimidate
a civilian population. Even if his acts were acts of retaliation or re-
venge against the university administration or the entire Case com-
munity, it does not mean that Halder had the expectation of causing
change or any purpose of creating fear as such. Halder's behavior,
without an express purpose to cause intimidation or coercion in a ci-
133 ld.
134Hiaasen & Mangels, supra note 118.
135 Id.
136 See Tobin & Hiaasen, supra note 122.
137 Id.
138 Id.
39 Several newspaper articles indicate that police believed Halder's grievance with the
school inspired the alleged shooting. E.g., Hiaasen & Mangels, supra note 118 (reporting that
"Cleveland police befieve that the feud [between Halder and Miller] was the reason he stormed
into the Lewis building"). If Halder's alleged actions were revenge motivated, they should not
rise to the level of terrorism as understood by the basic components of what action constitutes
terrorism.
140 Hiaasen & Mangels, supra note 118.
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vilian population, does not translate into terrorist action under the
Ohio statute.
To convict Halder of terrorism, Assistant Prosecutor Bell would
have had to establish that Halder's specific intention was not revenge,
but to cause intimidation and coercion within a civilian population
and that he carried out aggravated murder and kidnapping for that
end. Considering evidence of Halder's prior letters to police and other
officials, a jury could have conceivably found that Halder possessed
this intent. If this is the case, are Biswanath Halder's actions what the
Ohio Legislature truly had in mind when it passed its terrorism
legislation?
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT
A. What Was the Legislative Intent Behind the Passage of Ohio's
Terrorism Statute?
Legislative intent is to be ascertained from a consideration of all
the terms and provisions of the act. When a statute is ambiguous, the
court may attempt to discern intent by considering "among other mat-
ters: (A) The object sought to be attained; (B) The circumstances un-
der which the statute was enacted; (C) The legislative history; (D) the
common law or former statutory provisions . . . ; (E) The conse-
quences of a particular construction; [and] (F) The administrative
construction of the statute." 14 1 Further, it is presumed that the statute
is intended to be effective and have a "just and reasonable" result. 142
Although several Senate and House hearings were held regarding the
proposed terrorism bill, there was little discussion or commentary on
its purpose.
143
When introducing the legislation shortly after the September 1 1
attacks, Senator Spada stated, "We need to do everything possible
that we can to prevent things from happening and to swiftly and
severely punish those who are perpetrating these acts."' 44 Governor
141 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.49 (LexisNexis 2003).
1
4 2 Id. § 1.47(B)-(C).
143 See generally Create Offense of Terrorism and Declare Emergency: Hearing on SB184
Before the S. Judiciary on Criminal Justice, 124th General Assembly (Ohio 2001-2002), avail-
able at http://www.ohcapcon.com/ipc/ipcl.htm?/hannah/hanmenu.htm (on file with Case West-
ern Reserve Law Review). This Note examined hearings from Oct. 31, 2001; Nov. 15, 2001;
Nov. 29, 2001; Jan. 9, 2002; Jan.16, 2002; Jan. 23, 2002; Feb. 5, 2002; and Feb. 26, 2002.
144 Taft Urges Quick Passage of Anti-Terror Bills, Hannah Report (Oct. 30, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.ohcapcon.com/ipc/ipcl .htm?/hannah/hanmenu.htm (on file with Case West-
ern Reserve Law Review). Although Senator Spada sought legislation that more "swiftly"
punished those committing terrorist acts, the Ohio terrorism statute provides no authority for
hurried investigation, prosecution or punishment authority.
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Taft, speaking in support of the legislation, noted that the legislation
was intended to update Ohio's laws to address acts of terrorism and
safeguard Ohioans "[iln the wake of further terrorist attacks on our
country.'
' 45
Throughout the review process, little disagreement or concern was
raised regarding the legislation's enactment. Republican
Representative Bill Seitz voiced his unease about the potential for
peaceful protests and boycotts intended to "'coerce' the government
to take an action, or desist from one" to be prosecutable under the
bill. 146 John Murphy, of the Prosecuting Attorney's Association,
stated that "the bill is certainly not intended to apply to peaceful
protests" and that penalties attach only once a specified offense is
committed.147 As enacted, however, EPA demonstrators protesting oil
drilling in Alaska who are drawn into a brawl may still be considered
terrorists.
Little additional insight is provided regarding the statute's aims.
Given the circumstances under which the statute was enacted (in di-
rect response to 9/11) and Senator Spada's purpose of eliminating of
"these acts,"'148 arguably the statute is directed at the prevention of
terrorist attacks like those perpetrated by Al-Qaeda on September 11.
Reading the terrorism bill in accordance with section 1.49 of the Ohio
Revised Code, the statute's purpose appears to be to proscribe domes-
tic terrorist action against the United States similar to the September
11 attacks. Indeed, New York's legislative findings expressly notes
that New York's terrorism statute, on which Ohio's is based, is meant
to address additional terrorist threats such as the bombing of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, the bombings of the
World Trade Center in New York in 1993, and the bombing of the
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995.
The circumstances under which the Ohio statute was enacted, the
statute's desired objective, and the legislative history surrounding it
suggest that the legislature's intent was to aptly punish and potentially
deter terrorist attacks and violence perpetrated against civilians in the
service of some greater political, social, or religious purpose, such as
145 Swift Passage, supra note 88; see also OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, STATE AND
LOCAL ACTIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 81 (2002), available at http://www.ncs.gov/library/
policy-docs/State andLocalActions for HomelandSecurity.pdf (stating that Governor Bob
Taft signed Senate Bill 184 "[a]s a response to the September 1 th terrorist attacks").
'4 Committee Activity 124-SB184 House Criminal Justice, Hannah Report (Feb. 19, 2002),
available at http://www.ohcapcon.com/ipc/ipcl.htm?/hannah/hanmenu.htm (on file with Case
Western Reserve Law Review).
147 Id.
148 Taft Urges Quick Passage of Anti-Terror Bills, supra note 144.
149 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney Supp. 2005) note (Legislative Intent).
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the events of September 11. Arguably, the Ohio legislature was more
concerned with terrorist activities similar to those of Al-Qaeda than it
was with the alleged criminal actions of Biswanath Halder, who may
be adequately prosecuted under preexisting criminal statutes for kid-
napping and aggravated murder. In its discussions regarding the bill's
introduction and enactment, neither Senator Spada nor Governor Taft
related their respective purposes of punishing and deterring more of
"these acts" 50 to vengeful murder scenarios or even criminal hostage
situations. They considered the statute in its relation to the events of
September 11, criminalizing terrorism with a larger aim.
B. The Difference Between the Crime of Terrorism and Ordinary
Criminal Activity
There is a critical distinction between terrorism as a crime and so-
called ordinary criminal action. The development of state programs to
combat the threat of terrorism effectively blurs the lines existing be-
tween the understanding of terrorism and common crimes. Although
there has been a convergence of terrorism with historically common
crimes,15' there remains an essential difference between terrorists and
common criminals.
Terrorism as a crime is fundamentally different from criminal ac-
tivity in its values and the danger it poses to society, the government,
and public order. 52 In arguing that terrorism is fundamentally differ-
ent from ordinary criminal activity in its aims, Paul Pillar argues that
"[t]errorists' concerns are macroconcerns about changing a larger
order; [while] other violent criminals are focused on the microlevel of
pecuniary gain and personal relationships."'' 53 Terrorists, Pillar ar-
gues, always claim to be serving a greater cause, while common
criminals are motivated by personal desires and associations. 54
Halder's alleged actions were, arguably, motivated by revenge
against the single individual whom he was convinced sabotaged his
personal work, against whom he had exhausted all legal avenues, and
who was in the building the day he entered. Even if Halder sought
revenge against the administration of the university or the university
itself, arguably his actions were motivated exclusively by revenge for
M5 Taft Urges Quick Passage of Anti-Terror Bills, supra note 144.
'5, See LAQUEUR, supra note 26, at 225-26 (noting that the narcotics trade has become one
of the main sources of income for terrorist networks and that this money "has enabled the terror-
ist groups to acquire sophisticated weapons and to engage in costly operations which otherwise
would not have been possible").
152 GANOR, supra note 23, at 3.
153 PILLAR, supra note 32, at 14.
1iId.
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the administration's inaction against Miller. In writing about the ac-
tions of Washington-area snipers, John Allen Muhammad and Lee
Boyd Malvo, Mark Allenbaugh argues that "there is an enormous
difference between criminals who 'terrorize' and 'terrorists."' 
1 55
Criminals, he argues, act in response to "ego .... delusions .... or
other malignant, but personal, reasons" while terrorists' aims are
"motivated by some political end or belief."' 56 Actions taken in re-
venge for personal motives do not rise to the level of terrorism and
should not be charged as terrorist action.
There is no indication, based on legislative history or the circum-
stances under which the statute was enacted, that the Ohio legislature
intended to criminalize action committed with the purpose to intimi-
date or coerce based upon personal motivations. Halder's motiva-
tions, if based on personal revenge against Miller or the university
would, according to Pillar, qualify as a microlevel concern. Therefore,
the intent of the legislature is not reflected by his prosecution under
the state's terrorism statute.
Further, there is no additional incentive for the Ohio legislature to
create a penalty-enhancing criminal scheme against persons moti-
vated by personal relationships. Criminal activity based on purely
personal motivations constitutes more common criminal action that is
already criminalized based on ordinary criminal statute sanctions.
"Violent crimes are terrible. But they are not always terrorism. It's
important that we remember the distinction."'1
57
V. INAPPROPRIATE FOUNDATION
The state terrorism legislation enacted in both New York and Ohio
relied upon the federal definition of "international terrorism" found in
18 U.S.C. § 2331. Using this definition as a foundation, both New
York and Ohio made as elements of their respective crimes of "terror-
ism" those same elements that constitute the federal definition of in-
ternational terrorism. 158
55 Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Sniper Defendants: The Race To Prosecute First,
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/LAWl 1/01/findlaw.analysis.allenbaugh.sniper/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2005).
156Id.
157Elaine Cassel, Are There Gounds for Reversing D.C.-Sniper's Guilty Verdict?,
CNN.cOM, Nov. 24, 2003, http://www.cnn.com12003/LAW/ll/24/findlaw.analysis.cassel.
sniper.appeal/index.html.
158 The State of Ohio made slight changes to its definition as noted earlier by including a
mens rea requirement and altering the third element of the definition from those actions that
appear to be intended to "affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination
or kidnapping" to those actions committed with the purpose to "affect the conduct of any gov-
ernment by the specified offense." See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Again, Ohio
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Despite its location within the federal criminal code, § 2331's
definition of "international terrorism" (and "domestic terrorism" as
later added by the USA PATRIOT Act) does not serve as the ele-
ments of a criminal offense. 59 The definitions of international and
domestic terrorism in § 2331 are simply incorporated into a wide va-
riety of other statutory provisions throughout the code that individu-
ally proscribe particular activity (e.g., possession, use, and transfer of
biological agents and toxins1 60) or provide legal remedies (e.g., de-
termining civil liability for acts of international terrorism against na-
tionals of the United States 61 ). The federal definitions of international
and domestic terrorism were not intended to outline the elements of
proscribed criminal activity but merely to classify or categorize spe-
cific conduct already criminalized by federal and state statutes. 62
Section 2331's categorization of specific conduct as domestic terror-
ism is primarily for jurisdictional purposes relative to the authority to
investigate and prosecute certain types of this conduct. 163
In creating state sanctions for terrorist activity, several state legis-
latures 64 have, therefore, mistakenly relied upon a broad definition of
thereby criminalizes a significantly larger degree of conduct than conduct included in the defini-
tion of "international terrorism." New York's statute is functionally similar to that of the defini-
tion on which it is based, changing only "mass destruction" in the definition to "murder" in its
crime of terrorism. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
159 Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too
Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 257-59 (2004); see also Letter from Thomas E. Getz, Assistant
U.S. Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, to Tasia E. McIntyre (Mar. 22, 2005) (on file with
author). Several law review articles mistakenly and summarily determine that "domestic terror-
ism" as defined in the USA PATRIOT Act has created a corresponding crime of domestic
terrorism. See David Lombard Harrison, The USA PATRIOT Act: A New Way of Thinking, an
Old Way of Reacting, Higher Education Responds, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 177, 206 (2004) ("The
PATRIOT Act has also created a new crime of 'domestic terrorism."'); Jules Lobel, The War on
Terrorism and Civil Liberties, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 767, 789 (2002) ("[The USA PATRIOT Act]
creates a number of new, often vaguely defined crimes. One of the most dangerous to domestic
dissenters is the new crime of 'domestic terrorism."'); Steven A. Osher, Privacy, Computers and
the Patriot Act: The Fourth Amendment Isn't Dead, but No One Will Insure It, 54 FLA. L. REV.
521,540 (2002) (claiming that the USA PATRIOT Act "also creates the new crime of 'domestic
terrorism'); Phillip A. Thomas, Emergency and Anti-Terrorist Power: 9/11 USA and UK, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193, 1212 (2003) (stating that under the USA PATRIOT Act "Americans
engaged in civil disobedience or other forms of civil protest might be charged with 'domestic
terrorism'); Jennifer M. Hannigan, Comment, Playing Patriot Games: National Security Chal-
lenges Civil Liberties, 41 HOus. L. REV. 1371, 1380 (2004) (stating that the USA PATRIOT Act
modifies the United States Code to create "an expansively defined federal crime of 'domestic
terrorism').
1-42 U.S.C.A. § 262(a)(e)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (West Supp. 2003).
161 8 U.S.C. § 2333 (2000).
162 Letter from Thomas E. Getz to Tasia E. McIntyre, supra note 159.
163 Id.
114 At least nineteen state legislatures have used language such as "to intimidate" or "to co-
erce" a civilian population in creating criminal sanctions for terrorist acts, including Alabama,
ALA. CODE § 13A-10-151 (Supp. 2004); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-54-201 (Supp. 2005);
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terrorism that was not intended to outline the elements of criminal
activity. In so doing, these state legislatures have criminalized an ex-
pansive array of activity that steps beyond the foundational elements
inherent in terrorist action. Specifically, state statutes that proscribe
acts intended "to intimidate or coerce a civilian population" are sub-
ject to constitutional arguments charging them as void for vagueness.
Furthermore, such state statutes are likely to encounter procedural
application problems and do not otherwise appropriately address the
threat of terrorism.
VI. VOID FOR VAGUENESS?
Generally, an act of the state legislature is entitled to a strong pre-
sumption of constitutionality. 165 A statute may be considered imper-
missibly vague if it fails to give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may act
accordingly. 166 Further, a statute may be vague if it lacks minimal
legislative guidelines and permits arbitrary or discriminatory en-
forcement.167 Consequently, the Ohio terrorism statute may be void
for vagueness and challengeable under both the federal and state con-
stitutions on the ground that the statutory language is impermissibly
vague.
The Ohio terrorism statute rests on enumerated crimes that are
clearly prohibited conduct. To be charged and convicted of terrorism,
a defendant must further commit one of these enumerated "specified
offenses" with the "purpose to intimidate or coerce a civilian popula-
tion." The statute does not provide any definitional clarity or en-
forcement standards as to what constitutes a civilian population. A
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-300 (West Supp. 2005); District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-3152 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.30 (West
2005); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-4-10 (2003); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 708A.1 (West
2003); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:128.1 (2004); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.543b (West 2004); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.714 (West 2003); New York,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney Supp. 2005); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2909.24
(LexisNexis 2004); Oklahoma, OKL. STAT. ANN. Tit. 21, § 1268.1 (West 2002); South Carolina,
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-710 (2003); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-8-12 (Supp.
2003); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-803 (West 2003); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
107 (2003); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (2004); and West Virginia, W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 29B-1-4 (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
165 See ex rel. Jackman v. Ct. of C.P., 224 N.E.2d 906, 908-09 (1967) ("When an enact-
ment of the General Assembly is challenged, the challenger must overcome a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality."); see also Michael L. Stokes, Judicial Restraint and the Presumption
of Constitutionality, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 347 (2003) (discussing the history of and basis for the
presumption of constitutionality within the State of Ohio).
166 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
16 7 Id.
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man of ordinary intelligence will have to guess at the statute's mean-
ing, as it is ambiguous and fails to give fair and adequate warning of
the conduct proscribed. A defendant is unable to gauge his conduct
against an established standard and, therefore, is not effectively on
notice of what conduct is criminalized. A defendant who commits a
specified offense with the purpose to intimidate has no criterion
against which to judge whether those persons he intends to intimidate
will constitute a civilian population under the statute.
The statute's ambiguity is apparent when one recognizes the many
scenarios through which the unsuspecting may commit the crime of
terrorism. As noted earlier in Part II.B, EPA protestors drawn into a
brawl who thereby commit assault with the purpose to intimidate oil
workers may be charged as terrorists. Ohio State football fans rioting
after a defeat by Michigan surely have the intent of intimidating their
opponents. Therefore, the fans may effectively be charged and con-
victed of terrorism, according to the Ohio statute (they have commit-
ted the specified offense of "rioting" and have the specific intention
of intimidating the civilian population of the Michigan football team).
The ordinary individual who commits a specified offense is not effec-
tively on notice of whether his conduct will rise to the level of terror-
ism or whether he will be charged with terrorism given the vague,
indefinite, uncertain, and overbroad language of the Ohio terrorism
statute.
The statute is not automatically insulated from a vagueness argu-
ment simply because the statue has an express mens rea require-
ment. 168 Even a mens rea requirement of specific intent, as in the
Ohio terrorism statute, does not guarantee that the defendant is on
notice that his conduct constitutes a crime. 169 For example, Right to
Life protestors blocking an entrance to an abortion clinic who commit
assault with the purpose to intimidate a single woman as she walks
into the clinic have no standard against which to judge whether this
woman will constitute a civilian population and therefore have no
effective notice of whether their protest amounts to terrorism. Cer-
tainly, the protestors have committed a wrong in the first instance by
their assault, but should they be subjected to heightened sentencing
measures without notice of whether their conduct is proscribed under
the terrorism statute?
168 Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes - Balancing Acts, 5
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 1, 7 (1997) ("[T]he notion that a mens rea requirement can insulate a
statute from a vagueness challenge" is an "anomaly.").
169 1d. ( "[Elven that the defendant specifically intended to do the conduct prohibited by the
statute, would give no guarantee that the defendant had fair warning that the conduct was a
crime.").
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The Ohio legislature acted with undue haste in passing the state's
terrorism statute to placate the public demand for a proactive counter-
terrorism approach, and they did not act with the necessary delibera-
tion. The manifest lack of legislative intent and commentary on this
important legislation speaks to the brevity of the consideration that
the wording and terminology of the statute received. Such an extraor-
dinarily broad definition of terrorism has the potential to encompass a
breadth of activity that may lead to terrorism prosecutions against
persons whose alleged criminal conduct has nothing at all to do with
terrorism.t1°
VII. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
A. Potential Anomalous Application
The higher mental culpability standard of the Ohio statute has, in-
terestingly, created a certain anomaly in the statute's application
within the state. Throughout the early fall of 2003, commuters living
near the Ohio capital city of Columbus were terrified to drive to work
as a result of a number of random highway shootings south of the
city. For months, an unknown assailant shot at abandoned cars, com-
muting cars, houses, and a school in the area surrounding the city.
17 1
On November 25, 2003, Gail Knisley was killed while riding as a
passenger in a car traveling on 1-270 when she was shot from a high-
way overpass. 172 Police realized that they were dealing with a serial-
sniper when they were able to link several previous shootings to the
same gun that killed Knisley. After one death and more than twenty-
four reported incidents over eight months 173 the police arrested
Charles McCoy. 74 McCoy faces a twenty-four-count indictment
175
for charges on twelve incidents of shootings linked by ballistic evi-
170 New York ACLU, Legislative Memo: Anti-Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2004,
http://www.nyclu.org/leg-ml a_2004.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
171 Bruce Cadwallader & Dean Narciso, Woman Shot to Death on 1-270, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 2003, at Al.
1
7 2 
Id.
173 John Futty, A Year of Fear: Area Where Sniper Fired First Returns to Normal,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 10, 2004, at Al.
74 Bruce Cadwallader & John Futty, End of the Line: Highway Sniper Suspect Caught:
Court Appearance Friday, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 18, 2004, at Al.
175 Indictment of Charles Allen McCoy, Jr., Ohio v. Charles Allen McCoy, Jr., No. 04CR-
2195 (2004), available at http://www.co.franklin.oh.us/prosecutingattorney/content/pdf/
2635march30.pdf. Specifically, McCoy is charged with felonious assault (nine counts), at-
tempted murder (eight counts), vandalism (two counts), improperly discharging a firearm into a
habitation or into a school safety zone (three counts), aggravated murder (one count), and mur-
der (one count).
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dence. 176 Despite the nature of his alleged attack, McCoy has not been
charged with terrorism.
At first blush, the McCoy case appears strikingly similar to the ac-
tions of the Washington-area sniper John Allen Mohammad.
Mohammad was convicted of terrorism in a Prince Williams County
(Virginia) Court 177 for intentionally instilling fear throughout Wash-
ington, D.C., Virginia, and Maryland as he and accomplice Lee Boyd
Malvo, drove through suburban neighborhoods shooting civilians.17 s
In its prosecution for terrorism, 17 9 the state called a host of witnesses
to the stand to portray the fear felt throughout the Washington, D.C.
community.180 The highway sniper shootings in the metropolitan area
of Columbus had a similar effect. Commuters altered their regular
routes around the state capital to avoid the southern outer belt
where a majority of the shootings occurred, 82 and businesses in the
area suffered from a loss of patrons. 183
If McCoy's actions are functionally similar to those of Moham-
med, why then is McCoy not charged with terrorism? Under the Vir-
ginia Code, an "act of terrorism" is defined as an act of violence
committed with the intent "to intimidate the civilian population at
large; or influence the conduct or activities of the government of the
United States, a state or locality through intimidation."' 184 This lan-
guage is functionally similar to the language employed in the Ohio
statute, and each requires the commission of a specified offense or act
of violence with the intent (or purpose) to intimidate a civilian popu-
lation. The actions of both McCoy and Mohammad are also strikingly
176Bruce Cadwallader & Encamacion Pyle, Prosecutor Seeks Death for McCoy,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 2, 2004, at Al.
177 See Tom Jackman, Sniper Makes Appeal to Va. Supreme Court, WASHINGTON POST,
July 21, 2004, at BI.
178 John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo were charged in thirteen sniper shootings
that killed ten people and lasted more than three weeks within Maryland, Virginia, and Wash-
ington, D.C. See Neely Tucker & Serge F. Kovaleski, With Each New Killing A Stronger Dose
of Terror, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 25, 2002, at A9.
179 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4 (2004) defines terrorism as "an act of violence as defined
in clause (i) of subdivision A of § 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (1) intimidate the
civilian population at large; or (2) influence the conduct or activities of the government of the
United States, a state or locality through intimidation."
180 See Jackman, supra note 177 (noting that prosecutors argued "that the fear inflicted by
the random attacks and the snipers' demand for $10 million payment to stop the shootings
fulfilled both prongs of the law").
181 Darrel Rowland, Highway Shootings Worry Area Residents More than Possibility of
Terrorism, Poll Finds, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2003, at Al.
i82 John Futty, Serial Sniper Investigation: Driver Handled Situation Well After Gunshot,
Authorities Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 2004, at C 1.
183 Futty, supra note 173.
184 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4.
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similar, random, sniper-like shootings over an extended period of
time.
McCoy, however, has not been charged with terrorism because of
the Ohio statute's narrowly tailored mens rea requirement of purpose.
Although McCoy's actions may more readily equate to what would
be considered terrorism and what the Virginia courts indicated is ter-
rorism in that state, Franklin County, Ohio prosecutors have likely
determined that they are unable to meet the mens rea requirement of
purpose in charging McCoy.185 Though McCoy terrorized the city of
Columbus with random sniper shootings over a period of eight
months, prosecutors feel they are unable to prove that this was
McCoy's purpose. The Ohio terrorism statute is being employed
against Halder, whose actions may more commonly be considered a
revenge-motivated killing and not against McCoy, who terrorized the
Columbus area and whose crime is strikingly similar to the actions of
convicted Virginian terrorist John Allen Mohammad.
B. Unfettered Prosecutorial Discretion
The overly broad and vague terminology in the Ohio terrorism
statute encounters a second potential problem in its application-the
inherent prosecutorial discretion accompanying such broad language.
A statute runs the risk of being void if it is written in such a manner
as to permit or encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement'
86
because of unclear standards against which it is to be applied. A stat-
ute will likely fall prey to arbitrary enforcement by prosecutors if it
lacks minimal enforcement guidelines.
Prosecutors have wide discretion in deciding who to charge and
how to charge criminal defendants;1 87 these charging decisions are
seldom subject to review.188 A prosecutor's leeway is readily apparent
in connection with a statute such as the Ohio terrorism statute, under
which not only can the prosecutor choose to charge the defendant
185 Telephone Interview with Rick Bell, supra note 5. A mistrial was subsequently de-
clared in McCoy's trial in Columbus, Ohio after jurors deadlocked on whether McCoy was not
guilty by reason of insanity or guilty. It has not yet been determined whether or not Franklin
County prosecutors will retry McCoy. See Bruce Cadwallader, Four Jurors Were Sold on
McCoy's Insanity: Deadlock Didn't Vary During Deliberations, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May
10, 2005, at Al.
186 City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (noting that a criminal law may be
invalidated for vagueness if it "authorize[s] and even encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement").
'87Set Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 736-37 (1996) (noting that prosecutors are given great discretion for most
tasks).
'8 Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in Discretionary Deci-
sions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511, 1518 (2000).
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with a single offense, but he can choose to charge two offenses: the
underlying specified offense (i.e., aggravated murder) and the terror-
ism offense.
189
The vague and overly broad language of the Ohio statute further
expands the already enormous control that prosecutors exercise over
charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. 90 By leaving particular
terms undefined, a defendant has no standards against which to evalu-
ate his conduct and a prosecutor likewise has no guidelines to follow
in charging. The legislature has effectively deferred to the prosecutor
to define what criminal conduct will rise to the level of terrorism, 19'
thus enhancing his discretionary power. Accordingly, though the leg-
islature has outlined the criminal activity, "[i]n practice, the legisla-
ture has abdicated much of its authority to the prosecutor,"'192 making
the prosecutor the true crime enforcement policy-maker. 93 Such a
scheme persists, Professor William Stuntz argues, because both legis-
latures and prosecutors benefit from broad crime schemes: legisla-
tures are able to placate public demand for harsh treatment of crimi-
nals, and prosecutors may more easily prosecute crime under vaguely
defined statutes that inherently provide broader prosecutorial discre-
tion.194 This broad legislative action and subsequent prosecutorial
discretion, Stuntz notes, leads to an inconsistent application of the
criminal law between what is written and intended in the code and
what is applied on the street, denying defendants due notice of what
action is proscribed. 95 If inherent prosecutorial discretion leads to
inconsistent application of the criminal law, the law is effectively
applied in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.
189 C.f David Goldberger, Symposium Essay: The Inherent Unfairness of Hate Crime Stat-
utes, 41 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 449, 455-56 (2004) (arguing that hate crime legislation gives prose-
cutor discretion to charge defendant with underlying offense and the hate crime).
190C.f id. at 463 (arguing that hate crimes expand prosecutors' role over every stage of
criminal prosecution, including sentencing).
191 See Misner, supra note 187, at 742; see also William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 578 (2001) (claiming that prosecutors "are the [crimi-
nal justice] system's real lawmakers").
192 Misner, supra note 187, at 743.
193 Id. at 744.
194 Stuntz, supra note 191, at 506, 523-40. Despite the discussed potential for such broad
prosecutorial discretion to enhance arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, supporters of
prosecutorial discretion argue that this discretion is necessary for prosecutors to appropriately
apply the criminal law. See Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical Neces-
sity: The Ashcroft Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to "Seek Justice," 90
CORNELL L. REV. 237, 277 (2004) ("[P]rosecutors [in the context of federal charges] are
uniquely situated to 'seek justice' as a result of their familiarity with the circumstances of each
individual case. Constraints on prosecutorial discretion will ultimately deny individualized
justice and hinder the prosecutor from pursuing ethical norms which require her to "seek jus-
tice").
,95 Stuntz, supra note 191, at 519-23.
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Although the Ohio statute has an express intent requirement rais-
ing the level of proof required by the prosecutor, this alone will not
likely deter arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement 96 because of
the variety of conduct caught within the purview of the statute's broad
language. As the understanding of "civilian population" in the statute
remains undefined, a prosecutor may still bring terrorism charges and
sweep an enormity of conduct within the statute's breadth that has
nothing at all to do with terrorism. For example, a child is kidnapped
from a home and the kidnappers indicate that the child will not be
returned until ransom is paid. Clearly the specified offense of kidnap-
ping has been committed, and the defendant has expressed his coer-
cive intent by his unwillingness to return the child until the ransom
demand is met. Will the family of the kidnapped child constitute a
civilian population? Under the breadth of the Ohio statute the prose-
cutor could charge the kidnapper as a terrorist, though this is no more
than an "ordinary" kidnapping that has no political, social, or reli-
gious motivations.
In addition, considering the current age of heightened sensitivity to
terrorist action, other important yet irrational factors may play into a
prosecutor's decision of whether or not to charge an alleged criminal
with terrorism. Despite the government's assurance of continued neu-
trality and defense of Muslims and Arabs within the United States,
197
recent legislative and practical efforts continue to target this popula-
tion, such as racial profiling at airports, 198 mandatory immigration
registration of aliens from majority Muslim countries, 199 and mass
196 But see Batey, supra note 168, at 7-8 (arguing that the express intent requirement might
make the statute stronger because of the harder level of proof for the prosecutor, thereby deter-
ring arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement).
197The USA PATRIOT Act takes great care to condemn discrimination against Arab and
Muslim Americans within section 102, yet it has had and continues to have a devastating impact
on the actual freedom of U.S. Muslims. See PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 102, 115 Stat.
272, 276-77 (2001) (condemning acts of violence against Arab and Muslim Americans and
emphasizing their entitlement to full rights); see also Leila Nadya Sadat, Do All Arabs Really
Look Alike? Prejudice and the US "War" on Terror, 50 WAYNE L. REv. 69, 73 (2004) (arguing
that despite neutral rhetoric, the government appears "prepared to take uncharacteristically
draconian measures towards Muslims and Arabs").
198 See Ellen Baker, Flying While Arab - Racial Profiling and Air Travel Security, 67 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1375 (2002) (examining the issue of profiling Arabs and Muslims in airline
security); Sherri Sharma, Beyond "Driving While Black" and "Flying While Brown": Using
Intersectionality to Uncover the Gendered Aspects of Racial Profiling, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 275, 295-300 (2003) (highlighting the increase in racial and ethnic profiling, since 9/11,
towards both Arab and Muslim men and women); Charu A. Chandrasekhar, Note, Flying While
Brown: Federal Civil Rights Remedies to Post-9/1J Airline Racial Profiling of South Asians, 10
ASIAN L.J. 215 (2003) (discussing airline profiling of South Asians, specifically South Asian
Muslims).
199 Special registration subjects the nationals of predominately Arab and Muslim countries
to additional immigration screening and registration requirements. See U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Immigration Special Registration, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/special
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preventative detentions immediately after the September Il attacks. 200
State legislation aimed at targeting terrorism may fall prey to the
same biases-targeting Arab and Muslim minorities in the hopes of
deterring terrorism or placating public demand for greater punish-
ments. The American public and policy-makers continually connect
America's new terrorist threat to the Middle East and broadly to Mus-
lims in general.2°' Professor Ileana Porras argues that public percep-
tion in the United States views "'Islamic Fundamentalists' as terrorist
fanatics" and that "[t]he image of terrorists as Arabic fanatics is ubiq-
uitous in the media., 20 2 Western governments further judge Arabs and
the actions of Muslims with distrust 203 and the notion of "Mideast
Terrorism" has arguably become synonymous with "Islamic Terror-
ism.''2°4 Given this heightened sense of discriminatory enforcement
against Arab nationals and American Muslims since the September 11
attacks, the combination of overly broad language and unfettered
prosecutorial discretion may combine to place a discriminatory bur-
den on Arab Americans, presuming criminality and charging terror-
ism because of race, nationality, or religious beliefs.
VIII. DOES THE STATE CRIMINALIZATION OF TERRORISM
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE THREAT OF TERRORISM?
The attacks of September 11 took the American public by surprise
and the nation quickly learned that there was much more the govern-
ment could have done to protect us. But does state terrorism legisla-
tion truly address the threat that so many Americans feared after Sep-
tember 11 ? How does sentence-enhancing legislation at the state level
serve as a greater deterrent by providing increased penalties for al-
ready criminalized acts? Will Ohio's terrorism statute serve as an
effective deterrent to terrorist crime or does the statute represent noth-
ing more than symbolic legislation and political pandering enacted for
registration/index.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
20
°See David Cole, Security and Freedom - Are the Governments' Efforts to Deal With
Terrorism Violative of Our Freedoms?, 29 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 339, 340-41 (2003) (claiming that "in
the first seven weeks [after September 11], 1200 people were locked up" and were primarily
Arab and Muslim nationals).
201 See Ileana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw, 1994
UTAH L. REv. 119, 134 (1994) (noting American images of terrorism center on Islamic funda-
mentalists, and perhaps, even extends to Muslims more broadly).
202 ld.
203 Tariq A. Shah, Islam, Muslims and Terrorism: Secret Evidence and Guilt by Associa-
tion, 10 MSU-DCL J. INT'L. L. 589, 596 (2001).2
04 Fawaz A. Gerges, Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America, 588 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 73, 81 (2003) (citing Anthony Lewis, This Is America, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
1995).
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the goal of appeasing the public who cried for protection after Sep-
tember 11 ?
Proponents of state terrorism legislation will argue that, although
federal law exists to curb the incidence of terrorism, there were his-
torically no state laws to facilitate the prosecution and punishment of
terrorists in state courts.2°5 State laws, proponents reason, are needed
to complement federal laws to better protect citizens against terrorist
attacks.
The intentions of the legislature are clearly well-placed in attempt-
ing to prevent terrorism and more harshly punish its perpetrators.
However, it is unlikely that Ohio's terrorism statute will have such an
effect. It does not seem plausible that an increased penalty based on
this overarching purpose to intimidate a population will at all deter
someone willing to commit aggravated murder.206 A terrorist who
truly believes that he is acting for some higher cause, such as a per-
ceived religious righteousness or to free himself from oppression, is
not likely to base his decision of whether or not to commit a crime on
the notion that his purpose in committing a felony will subject him to
the death penalty rather than life in prison. If terrorism statutes are
unlikely to have any deterrent effect, they serve no purpose other than
to send a symbolic message to placate public fears.
207
In considering the impact of the Ohio terrorism statute on local
criminal caseloads, the Ohio General Assembly raised some signifi-
cant points, citing three primary reasons why the statute will have
little to no effect on the local caseload population:
First, the particular conduct incorporated into the definitions
of these terrorism related offenses involves, in most in-
stances, activities that already rise to the level of felonies un-
der current law. This means that, if these acts were to be
committed in the future absent the bill's terrorism provisions,
these would still be acts for which individuals can be arrested,
prosecuted, and sanctioned.
205 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.05 (McKinney Supp. 2005) note (Legislative Intent)
(pointing out the gap in state law).
206 C.f Brian S. MacNamara, New York's Hate Crimes Act of 2000: Problematic and Re-
dundant Legislation Aimed at Subjective Motivation, 66 ALB. L. REV. 519, 531 (2003) (arguing
that sentencing-enhancing structures of state hate-crime legislation will likely have no deterrent
effect on persons committing hate crimes).207 Although one may argue that terrorism enhancements may have the effect of incapacita-
tion or a retributive basis, it is important to remember that each of these crimes is previously
criminalized and would not otherwise go unpunished.
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Second, acts of terrorism and support for terrorism, as defined
in the bill, have historically been very rare in the State of
Ohio.
Third, should acts of terrorism as defined in the bill occur, it
is most likely that the federal government would take the lead
in such matters under its terrorism laws and assume the asso-
ciated investigative, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and sanction-
ing costs.
2 °8
Without doing so deliberately, the General Assembly has effec-
tively questioned the purpose, validity, and deterrent effect of Ohio's
terrorism statue. The commission of a "specified offense" means that
the proscribed action would not otherwise have gone uninvestigated,
unprosecuted, or unpunished. Further, the General Assembly notes
that acts of terrorism within the state "have historically been very
rare. 2 ° 9 It can certainly be conceded that the crimes of aggravated
murder and kidnapping have not been comparatively "very rare" in
the state of Ohio, even in the context of hostage situations. The Gen-
eral Assembly, it appears, would not itself even consider these more
ordinary criminal activities, for which Halder is charged, as "acts of
terrorism" under the statute. In addition, when and if a genuine act of
terrorism does occur within the state, it will likely be preempted and
effectively investigated, prosecuted, and sanctioned by the federal
government. Accordingly, if Ohio's terrorism statute has no deterrent
effect and criminalizes actions punishable under the preexisting
criminal law and handled under the federal criminal law, then in ef-
fect the terrorism legislation serves no purpose.
Even further than its immediate inability to deter terrorist behav-
ior, state statutes criminalizing terrorism may effectively undermine
the country's counterterrorist policy. Laura Donohue argues that state
laws undermine the ability of and need for the federal government to
"enforce a unified counterterrorist policy," eventually confusing the
effectiveness and legitimacy of federal counterterrorism policy.21 0
The advent of terrorist legislation in each of the fifty states will likely
create at least fifty competing definitions of what constitutes terror-
ism, not including the several definitions that already exist in the fed-
2o Fiscal Note and Local Impact Statement, 124th General Assembly of Ohio (Mar. 20,
2002), available at http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/fiscalnotes/124ga/SB0184EN.HTM.
209 Id.
210 Laura K. Donohue & Juliette N. Kayyem, The Rise of Counterterrorist States 13 (Feb.
2001) (John F. Kennedy School of Law, Harvard University, BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-1),
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA-content/documents/Rise ofCounterterroristStates.pdf.
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eral government.211 These multiple legal definitions may result in
"overlap, confusion, and ambiguity ' 212 not only for citizens trying to
determine what acts constitute terrorism and the application of each
statute213 but also in the application of a cohesive antiterrorism policy.
Already there is discussion that prosecutions at the federal level of
international terrorist offenses since September 2001 are plagued with
unclear standards in classifying terrorist offenses.21 4 Nora Demleitner
argues that the increased application of international terrorist statutes
may enhance public insecurity in safety and create unnecessary alarm
over ordinary criminal activity.21 5 Although Demleitner focuses on
increased prosecutions of international terrorism, arguably this prob-
lem will be amplified by additional prosecutions under state terrorism
statutes. Further, the General Accounting Office has recently deter-
mined, in commenting on the variety of federal definitions of terror-
ism, that "the potential exists for an uncoordinated approach to com-
bating terrorism caused by duplication in efforts or gaps in coverage,
misallocation of resources, and inadequate monitoring of expendi-
tures., 216 A unified definition of what constitutes terrorism, 217 be-
tween both federal and state authorities, will provide a more coherent
approach to combating terrorism in the United States, effectively
eliminate inconsistency between state and federal prosecutions and
understandings of terrorism, provide improved notice to defendants,
and enhance public security.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Over the past few years, state legislatures have hurriedly enacted
terrorism legislation aimed at preventing terrorism and prosecuting
terrorists who threaten homeland security. The motivation has been
primarily political-to placate public demand after the government's
failure to ascertain the threat of terrorism against the United States
prior to September 11, and there has been little public dissent.21 8
211 Twenty-two different definitions of terrorism currently exist in the federal government.
Perry, supra note 159, at 273.212 Noteboom, supra note 2 1, at 568.
213 See id.
214Nora V. Demleitner, How Many Terrorists Are There? The Escalation in So-Called
Terrorism Prosecutions, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 38, 38 (2003).
215 Id. at 42.
216 Perry, supra note 159, at 273 (quoting Combating Terrorism: Observations on National
Strategies Related to Terrorism: Testimony Before House Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec., Emerging
Threats, and Int'l Relations of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 7 (2003) (state-
ment of Raymond J. Decker, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management)).
217 See id. at 272-74 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of a unified definition of ter-
rorism).218 For example, there was little dissent or discourse prior to the passage of the USA
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On first review, state criminal sanction may appear to be a suffi-
cient deterrent and effective means of combating and punishing ter-
rorism. The threat of terrorism arises on all levels and is certainly not
limited to attacks the size of those that occurred on September 11. As
a symbol of the current political climate, state terrorism legislation
may make sense, but as a method of preventing terrorism, protecting
the public, or punishing terrorists, state terrorism statutes are less than
ideal. These statutes may be seen as a classic example of "symbolic
politics, ' '2 19 satisfying the public's need for reassurance rather than
offering a tangible or pragmatic mechanism to respond to the threat of
terrorism in the United States.22°
That portion of the Ohio statute that considers it a crime of terror-
ism to commit a "specified offense" with the "purpose to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population" raises constitutional concerns as a
result of its vague terminology and potential for arbitrary and selec-
tive enforcement. Further, as evidenced by the Halder case, the Ohio
terrorism statute captures within its breadth actions not commonly
understood as terrorism and serves no effective purpose in deterring
terrorist action. The legislation serves only as a sentence-enhancing
statute, further criminalizing more ordinary criminal activity already
effectively deterred and penalized by preexisting statutes proscribing
the underlying behavior.
While this Note argues that a cohesive federal approach to defin-
ing and combating terrorism is more appropriate and will result in a
fairer, unified application of counterterrorist policy, state-sponsored
terrorism statutes are likely to flourish. With more than thirty-three
states221 currently using legislation to criminalize terrorism and re-
lated acts within their borders, we must determine the appropriate
boundaries for state terrorism legislation in implementing an effective
PATRIOT Act, despite later ruminations that the Act was hurriedly passed. See William Crotty,
On the Home Front: Institutional Mobilization to Fight the Threat of International Terrorism, in
THE POLITICS OF TERROR 191, 198 (William Crotty ed., 2004) (arguing that "[flew in Congress
argued for restraint, a reasoned approach, a better understanding of the threat to national secu-
rity, or the most productive ways to handle such an uncertain venture").
219 Murray Edelman coined the term "symbolic politics" in the 1960's, arguing that the
public views political activity in symbolic terms, distinguishing between political legislative
activity that "produces tangible benefits and activity that conveys only symbolic reassurances."
See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for
Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1227, 1247-54 (2000) (discussing hate crime legisla-
tion as "symbolic politics"); see generally Patricia Ewick & Austin Sarat, Hidden in Plain View:
Murray Edelman in the Law and Society Tradition, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 439 (2004) (re-
viewing Edelman's work on social life and politics and his contributions to law and sociolegal
studies).
220 Beale, supra note 219 at 1248.
221 National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 25.
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counterterrorism approach. To that end, the state of Ohio and future
state enactments should clarify statutory language, review alternative
measures passed in other states, and limit prosecutorial discretion in
charging terrorism.
A. Eliminate or Clarify Language: "To Intimidate or Coerce A
Civilian Population"
In comparing similar state legislative responses to terrorism, it is
apparent that clearly defined language is necessary to detail those
actions rising to the level of terrorism and those that do not. Other
state statutes enacted after September 11 have been drafted with sig-
nificantly greater specificity than Ohio's, more aptly detailing what
action will be considered terrorism.
If Ohio is determined to rectify its terrorism legislation, the
statute's language should be altered. Specifically, the statute should
either eliminate entirely or significantly clarify that portion of the
statute that requires a "specified offense" to be committed with the
purpose to "intimidate or coerce the civilian population." As earlier
discussed, this language poses significant constitutional concern and
procedural problems, and it fails to adequately address or prevent the
threat of terrorism as required by the legislative intent. In addition,
this portion of the Ohio statute and those of similar state statutes do
not equate to elements inherent in terrorist action and, therefore,
encompasses a broad array of activity that may be in no way related
to terrorism.
If the state of Ohio chooses to maintain this portion of its terrorism
legislation, the term "civilian population" must be defined to include,
at minimum, a particular number of individuals.222 Further, the statute
must relate this activity to motives inherent to the definition of terror-
ism: violence perpetrated for larger political, social, or religious aims.
As currently written, the Ohio terrorism statute subjects a common
criminal who commits a specified offense for personal gain or venge-
ance to prosecution as a terrorist, bringing within its purview more
ordinary criminal actions. Accordingly, that portion of the statute that
punishes a defendant for actions committed with the purpose "to in-
timidate or coerce a civilian population" by itself, without a determi-
nation of appropriate motives or a clear understanding of what consti-
222 This approach has been taken by the State of New Jersey in its terrorism legislation, re-
quiring that a specified offense be committed with the purpose "to terrorize five or more per-
sons." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-2 (West 2004). An analysis of the benefits of this approach is
provided below. See infra Part IX.B.
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tutes a civilian population, is overly broad and vague and necessitates
revision.
B. Consider Alternatives Provided By Other States
Statutes passed in New Jersey and Oklahoma serve as examples of
state terrorism legislation with potentially effective alternatives to the
language employed in the Ohio legislation. Although not faultless,
these statutes provide additional options that forthcoming state stat-
utes may consider to avoid the vague terminology employed by
Ohio's terrorism legislation.
Specifically, New Jersey Statute Annotated 2C:38-2 claims that a
person is guilty of terrorism if he commits or attempts, conspires or
threatens to commit (a specified offense) with the purpose:
(1) to promote an act of terror; or
(2) to terrorize five or more persons; or
(3) to influence the policy or affect the conduct of govern-
ment by terror; or
(4) to cause by an act of terror the impairment or interruption
of public communications, public transportation, public or
private buildings, common carriers, public utilities or other
public services.223
"Terror" is defined within the statute as "the menace or fear of
death or serious bodily injury',224 and terrorism "convey[s] the men-
ace or fear of death or serious bodily injury by words or actions.22 5
This statutory scheme improves notice of the proscribed criminal ac-
tivity by specifically defining core terms and requiring that "five or
more persons ' '226 be terrorized for an action to rise to the level of ter-
rorism. Further, the statute criminalizes specific actions: the impair-
ment or interruption of public communications, transportation, build-
ings, common carriers, public utilities, or other public services. Such
detail will provide defendants with the notice they require to deter-
mine whether their actions will rise to the level of terrorism.
The State of Oklahoma defines terrorism as
an act of violence resulting in damage to property or personal
injury perpetrated to coerce a civilian population or
government into granting illegal political or economic
223 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-2.
224 Id.
225 ]d.
226 Id.
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demands; or conduct intended to incite violence in order to
create apprehension of bodily injury or damage to property in
order to coerce a civilian population or government into
granting illegal political or economic demands. Peaceful
picketing or boycotts and other nonviolent action shall not be
considered terrorism.
227
While the statute maintains the broad language of "civilian popula-
tion," it succeeds in considerably strengthening other portions of its
statute. An act of violence must result in damage to property or per-
sonal injury, a more measurable standard as compared to the subjec-
tive concept of intimidation under the Ohio statute. Further, the stat-
ute requires coercion for specific ends, namely "illegal political or
economic demands," instituting the foundational elements of terrorist
action into the crime. The Oklahoma statute additionally provides
detailed examples of action it is not meant to encompass, such as
"peaceful picketing .... boycotts .... [or] other nonviolent action., 228
C. Limit Prosecutorial Discretion
Enacting guidelines that will reduce prosecutorial discretion in
charging a defendant with terrorism will help to limit the negative
effects of overcharging and the potential for discriminatory charging.
Although application of the criminal law requires the use of judg-
ment,229 the creation of specific policies, mandated training, consulta-
tion, and supervision of discretionary choices 230 will help to avoid
inefficient and discriminatory application of the criminal law.
The New Jersey terrorism statute addresses this issue by placing
restrictions on a prosecutor's discretionary charging decision. In New
Jersey, a county prosecutor or assistant prosecutor must obtain prior
approval "expressly authorized in writing by the Attorney General"
231
before a defendant is charged with terrorism. This effective check and
balance system will limit that prosecutorial discretion inherent in
Ohio's terrorism statute. The Attorney General, against whom a
prosecutor must first defend his decision to charge terrorism, will
effectively serve to consult with and supervise the discretionary deci-
sions of local prosecutors.
227 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1268.1 (West 2002).
228 /d.
229 Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 306-07
(2001) (explaining why criminal law cannot be applied mechanically).
230 Id. at 307 (concluding that prosecutorial offices require "specific policies of discretion,
and mandate[d] training, consultation, supervision and review of discretionary choices").
231 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:38-2.
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The significant potential for selective prosecution and disparate
treatment of Arab Americans and Muslims under the broad language
of the Ohio statute, and similar state statutes, requires oversight of
prosecutorial discretion when charging terrorism. In addition to im-
mediate supervisory oversight, prosecutors should be subject to strict
orientation programs, training, and stringent office policies on charg-
ing.232 "While strict rules designed to meet every conceivable situa-
tion would be impossible, detailed outlines, explicit hypotheticals,
and mechanisms for accountability are feasible and needed. 233
D. Conclusion
That portion of the Ohio statute criminalizing actions committed
with the purpose "to intimidate or coerce a civilian population" is
flawed in both its drafting and its application. Following the lead of
New York, the Ohio legislature has created an overly broad statute
that potentially subjects a host of ordinary criminals to enhanced
prison sentences and additional public stigmatization as a terrorist.
As evidenced by the Halder case, the Ohio statute does not serve
the legislative purpose for which it was enacted. Furthermore, it is
being employed against ordinary criminal activity in the absence of
intimidation or coercion for the specific ends inherent in terrorist ac-
tion, namely political, social, or religious goals. In addition, the stat-
ute raises significant questions regarding its constitutionally vague
language and its potentially arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.
Finally, even though deterrence is one of the fundamental aims of the
criminal law, the Ohio terrorism statute provides no realistic deterrent
effect of preventing terrorism within the state or the nation, despite its
sentence enhancing scheme.
Although a single, unified definition of terrorism and a federal-
only approach to controlling terrorism may be more effective, state
statutes are likely to prosper in the coming years. To avoid continuing
the anomalous application of the statute within the state, the Ohio
legislature should undertake an initiative to amend the statute's overly
broad language, incorporate specific aims inherent in terrorist action,
and limit the statute's inherent prosecutorial discretion.
Providing additional law enforcement capabilities in the deterrence
and punishment of terrorist activities is certainly a necessary step in
protecting the United States and each individual state from the threat
232 See Griffin, supra note 229, at 293-95 (discussing how to develop individual prosecuto-
rial discretion).
233 Id. at 262 (quoting Comment, Justice Department's Prosecution Guidelines of Little
Value to State and Local Prosecutors, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 961 (1981)).
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or commission of terrorist actions. However, it is important to truly
address the existing threat rather than only enact hurriedly passed
symbolic legislation designed solely to placate the public. Current
state terrorism statutes should be reassessed to conform with a cohe-
sive federal counterterrorist policy and appropriately define, address,
and punish only genuine terrorist threats. States considering the
toughening of their criminal laws should take into considerations the
flaws of their predecessors and consider alternative measures.
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